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Until recently, bankruptcy scholarship focused on the ex post case;
scholars in evaluating competing bankruptcy proposals asked which scheme
would be efficient, distributionally just, and administratively feasible. This
research program implicitly assumes that the type of bankruptcy law in
place could not affect how firms and investors behaved prior to bankruptcy.
The recognition that this premise is erroneous has led to a new research
program, under which scholars ask how the bankruptcy law influences
parties' efforts to resolve disputes once insolvency has occurred' and,
moving backward in time, how the law influences the parties' incentives to
invest.2
Robert Rasmussen's paper makes a useful contribution to the latter line
of research.' His paper discusses the effect of current bankruptcy law on
a firm's investment incentives and inquires whether proposed bankruptcy
reforms improve these incentives. In Rasmussen's well-argued view, none
of the new schemes is an improvement in all circumstances; but each of
them could be superior in particular cases. This conclusion then becomes
the premise for Rasmussen's central normative claim: because no
imaginable bankruptcy system clearly dominates, parties should be free to
choose the bankruptcy system that will apply to their case. Further, the
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor, Yale School of Management. This
Comment benefitted greatly from conversations with Barry Adler. He, Ian Ayres, Henry Hansmann,
Robert Rasmussen, and George Triantis also made helpful comments on prior drafts.
1. See, e.g., Helmut Bester, The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation, 26 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 72 (1994); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36
J.L. & ECON. 595 (1993).
2. See Barry E. Adler, Voidable Preferences and Corporate Investment (Mimeograph 1994) (on
file with author); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of
Bankruptc., Theory, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 465; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy
and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991).
3. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994).
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state minimizes contracting costs by supplying parties with a menu of
bankruptcy options from which to select.
4
Modem economies are highly heterogeneous; hence, that a particular
bankruptcy scheme would be optimal in all cases regarding both settlement
and investment incentives is unlikely. Thus, Rasmussen's conclusion that
bankruptcy law should be a set of defaults seems correct.' As a conse-
quence, this Comment will focus on an aspect of the various reform
schemes that Rasmussen notes but does not discuss in detail: each of these
schemes increases the likelihood that the absolute priority rule will be
strictly followed in bankruptcy. When absolute priority is strictly followed,
senior claims are paid in full before junior claims get paid at all. Of
particular significance, strict adherence to absolute priority eliminates the
equity claim because it is the most junior.
The effect of strictly following absolute priority on a firm's incentive to
invest is now thought to be ambiguous. As a normative matter, scholars
hold, firms should only invest in positive net present value projects. Strict
adherence to absolute priority is now thought to increase the likelihood in
some circumstances that firms will invest appropriately, but to reduce that
likelihood in others. Conversely, not strictly following absolute priority
will sometimes do good and other times not.
This Comment argues that a relaxed absolute priority rule (i.e., the
current rule) worsens investment incentives more frequently than is
commonly supposed. Even if this is true, the debate over absolute priority
should go on; for, as said, deviations also can have positive effects. A
general model that takes account of all relevant trade-offs, and thus permits
a general solution, is badly wanted. So also is empirical evidence
respecting how bankruptcy law incentives actually affect firms' investment
behavior. In the absence of general models and good data, clarifications
of the sort developed below are helpful but not conclusive.
Part II briefly summarizes the prevailing view respecting the effect of
4. This latter view is argued for at greater length in Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A
Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV. 51 (1992).
5. Rasmussen suggests that the current Code should provide the default rules if parties do not
choose another bankruptcy option. Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1210 n.142. This change would have
an "information forcing" effect for parties who preferred one of the options. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 97-107 (1989). The items on the menu themselves would be "problem solving defaults" because
they would supply solutions to the various insolvency problems that firms face. For a taxonomy of
default rule types, see Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 389 (1994).
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absolute priority on the firm's investment incentives. Part III argues that
deviating from absolute priority worsens the underinvestment problem.
This problem exists when firms reject projects that have positive net
present values (an overinvestment problem exists when firms take projects
that have negative net present values). Rasmussen's paper follows the
conventional view that the underinvestment problem exists only in
connection with insolvent firms. This Comment goes beyond his analysis
to show that the underinvestment problem can affect solvent firms as well.
The reason is this: unless a firm has excess cash, it cannot take a project
unless it can persuade investors to provide the money. If the firm has prior
debt, or if moral hazard is possible, investors may demand such a high
return to provide funds that the project becomes unprofitable for the firm,
though the project generates revenues in excess of nonfinancing costs.
The models that yield this result assume that the firm can credibly
promise to pay as large a fraction of its assets to investors as profit
maximization requires. Deviations from absolute priority exacerbate the
underinvestment problem exposed by these models; for such deviations
reserve a share of the firm's assets to the equity in the "failure state,"
regardless of what the debt contract says. As a consequence, the firm
either must promise to repay a larger share of project returns to investors
in the "success state," or it must promise to make available a larger amount
of assets to investors in the failure state to overcome the effect of priority
deviations. When the promise to repay a larger sum in the success state
would convert a profitable project into a loser, or when the firm does not
have excess assets to offer, the firm will reject a positive value project that
it would have taken had absolute priority been strictly followed. This is
inefficient; for doing the project would have made the firm and its investors
better off on an expected basis while making no one worse off. Moreover,
this inefficiency is unavoidable because current law prevents parties from
contracting out of bankruptcy or altering the bankruptcy rules that make
deviations from absolute priority possible.6
Part III.A. discusses the prior debt case; Part III.B. discusses moral
hazard. The analyses in these sections show that a relaxed absolute priority
rule causes harm in a context that previously had been thought irrelevant
to the rule's effects. Part IV is a conclusion.
6. These rules are discussed in Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the
Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 253 (1992).
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II. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY AND INVESTMENT: A SUMMARY
There are two defining circumstances that lead to four relevant cases:
whether the absolute priority rule is strictly followed in bankruptcy or it is
not; and whether a firm is solvent when it has an investment opportunity
or it is not. Suppose initially that absolute priority is strictly followed and
the firm is solvent. The rule then has three possible bad effects. First, the
current equity would lose the firm were bankruptcy to occur; for their
interest then is worthless. This increases the likelihood that the current
managers will be fired. A manager may respond to this possibility by
causing his firm to take projects, when the firm is solvent, that the manager
has a peculiar capability to manage, whether these are the most profitable
projects or not. Then if the firm becomes insolvent but is not liquidated
piecemeal, the new owners have an incentive to retain the manager; he may
be the only person who knows what is going on.7
Second, when the firm already has debt, there is an overinvestment
problem.' Creditors can ameliorate this problem by requiring the firm to
use convertible debt or to include call provisions in its bonds. The former
mitigates the incentive of equity to take high risk projects because the
equity must share the gains with converting bondholders in the event of a
high payoff.9 The latter mitigates the overinvestment problem because
overinvestment reduces the value of the debt; this reduces the value of the
equity's call option. Third (as this Comment later shows), there is an
underinvestment problem.
If the firm is insolvent when it has an investment opportunity, everyone
agrees that the overinvestment problem is worsened. The firm also faces
an underinvestment problem, though for different reasons than those briefly
described in Part I. To understand these "insolvency reasons," assume that
an insolvent firm has the resources to undertake a positive value project
whose returns in the success state are insufficient to restore the firm to
solvency. Then project returns, in both success and failure states, would
7. The result that managers have an incentive to invest in projects that they can best manage in
order to preserve their jobs was first established in the context of hostile takeovers in Andrei ShIcifer
& Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case ofManager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN.
ECON. 123 (1989). It was extended to the bankruptcy context in LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & RANDAL C.
PIcKER, BANKRUPTCY RULES, MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT AND FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL
(University of Chicago, Law & Economics Working Paper No.16, 2d Series, 1993).
8. The more debt the firm has, the more serious is this problem. See Richard C. Green & Eli
Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10 J. BANKING & FIN. 391 (1986).
9. See T. Harikumar et al., Convertible Debt and Investment Incentives, 17 J. FIN. RES. 15 (1994).
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accrue exclusively to the creditors. As a consequence, the firm's owners
have no incentive to pursue the project; rather, they are likely to use firm
cash to meet current expenses. Finally, the existence of insolvency may
reduce the ability of a firm's managers to choose projects only they can
manage because there will be less cash to do projects.
Assume next that absolute priority is not followed. Scholars now agree
that deviations from absolute priority worsen the overinvestment problem
for solvent firms. 0 These deviations increase the payoff to equity in the
failure state while not affecting its payoff in the success state. Hence, the
equity has a greater incentive to invest in a project with a high failure
probability if the project has a high payoff in the success state: some such
projects can have negative net present values. Deviations from absolute
priority would worsen the "management entrenchment problem" only if
these deviations increase the probability that the equity will retain the firm
after a bankruptcy. This seems unlikely. Finally, as said above and
developed below, deviations from absolute priority worsen the
underinvestment problem for solvent firms.
When the firm is insolvent at the time it must decide to invest, neither
convertibles nor call provisions can mitigate the overinvestment problem.
The conversion option is worthless when the firm is insolvent because the
debt is then worth more than the equity; hence, the creditors never will
convert. The call privilege also is valueless because the debt is worth less
than the option price; consequently, it will never be called. Deviations
from absolute priority are helpful, however, because when absolute priority
is not strictly followed, the equity participates in the creditors' payoff. This
participation creates an incentive for equity not to reduce the value of the
debt; and this incentive partly countervails the equity's incentive to take
high risk projects with high payoffs." Deviations from absolute priority
10. This point was first made in Barry Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 439, 473-75 (1992). Deviations from absolute priority may cure overinvestment, however, when
there is little serial correlation between a firm's cash flows. In this circumstance, the firm will default
when the private payoff to the equity from violating absolute priority exceeds the private value from
continuance. Default commonly induces renegotiation among affected parties, and renegotiation can
create a capital structure with efficient incentives. See Robert Heinkel & Josef Zechner, Financial
Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 531 (1994).
However, a firm's cash flows would seem generally to have high serial correlations-today's earnings
are much like yesterday's-so the practical importance of this insight is unclear.
11. Rasmussen's paper shows how deviations from absolute priority mitigate the overinvestment
problem for insolvent firms. Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1178-79. A more formal treatment with
numerical simulations is in Allan C. Eberhart & Lemma W. Senbet, Absolute Priority Rule Violations
and Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1993, at 101.
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also solve the underinvestment problem that otherwise would arise from the
creditors' ability to take all project returns in both failure and success
states. If the equity anticipates a deviation from absolute priority, it
expects to share in project returns in the bankruptcy proceeding; the better
the project is, the more valuable the share is. Thus the insolvent firm has
an incentive to take optimal projects. 2
To summarize, deviations from absolute priority apparently have little
effect on the management entrenchment problem. Otherwise, these
deviations are ambiguous. They worsen the overinvestment problem for
solvent firms but mitigate it for insolvent firms, and also, in the common
view, solve the underinvestment problem for insolvent firms. This
Comment next shows, in contrast, that deviations from absolute priority
worsen the underinvestment problem for both solvent and insolvent
firns.
13
III. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY AND THE Ex ANTE UNDERINVESTMENT
PROBLEM
A. Debt Overhang
A firm that has prior debt may be unable to raise sufficient debt or new
equity to invest in positive value projects. This is because, as discussed
above, the firm may have to promise the later creditor such a high return
that even a positive value project may not be worth pursuing. To see how
this can happen, 4 suppose that at t' a firm finances a positive net present
value project with debt. The firm borrows in a competitive credit market,
and the debt contract requires it to repay d1 at t'. The project returns y, at
t2 with probability 7t, and Yh with probability (1 - it) where y, < y,. The
12. Rasmussen establishes this result formally. See Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1185-86.
13. There is a question when solvent firms face under- and overinvestment problems. The former
is more likely to affect firms that have growth opportunities; these firms may be caused to reject good
projects. The latter problem is more likely to affect mature firms with few growth opportunities but
with cash to invest. These possibilities are reviewed in John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Equity
Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt (Mimeograph 1994) (on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly).
14. The model in this section is based on Elazer Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting
and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J. FIN. 765 (1990). Rasmussen
claims that solvent firms will take all positive value projects, but the model on which this claim is based
implicitly assumes that a firm with debt can finance later projects with internal funds. Such a firm has
an incentive to put its funds to the best use. The analysis here, in contrast, assumes that the firm needs
external financing to do its projects.
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firm's only assets are these returns. The failure-state return, y,, is assumed
to be less than the debt, d,, so there is a positive probability of default.
Thus, the value of the equity if the firm does the project is Ey = (1 - 7c)(y h -
dl): the owners keep the excess after repaying the debt in the success state,
while the creditors take the firm in the failure state. 5
The firm can take a second project at t' that it must finance with external
funds. This project returns z at t2 with probability nr, and z + s with
probability (1 - 7c); that is, the new project returns z with certainty and z +
s only with positive probability. 6 The project costs i to do, which the
firm will borrow; the later debt, d2, will take behind the earlier." Project
returns are sufficiently positively correlated so that y, + z < d, + d2; the
firm will be insolvent if the failure state is realized.
The face value of the later loan is obtained by solving the following
equation:
i =7rb + (1 - t)d 2  (1)
where b = max[yL + z - d1,O]. The firm needs the sum i. The first term in
equation (1) is the later creditor's expected payoff in the failure state: the
probability of failure is r and the payoff is b. Regarding b, if the firm
defaults, it has to pay the initial debt first. The amount from which the
firm must pay this debt is the firm's total return in the failure state y, + z.
The sum y, + z - d, is left over for the later creditor if this sum is positive;
otherwise, this creditor receives nothing if the project fails. The second
term in equation (1) is the later creditor's expected payoff in the success
state-i.e., the probability of success (1 - t) times the creditor's success
payoff, d2. Hence, d2 is obtained by asking how much the creditor will
require to lend i given the expected return on the firm's projects and the
level of prior debt.
If the firm takes the second project, the value of its equity becomes
E = (1 - n)(yh + z + s - d, - d2); the equity is only paid in the success state,
15. The analysis ignores discount rates for simplicity. It also assumes that the parties are
symmetrically informed about relevant economic variables.
16. Decomposing project returns into a certainty component and a risky component is analytically
convenient and realistic. Firms commonly can anticipate that new projects will always return some
minimal sum (even the Edsel had positive sales); the uncertainty concerns the upside.
17. Debt from later projects commonly is junior to earlier project debt because substantial lenders
routinely require covenants that prevent firms from borrowing elsewhere without the earlier lender's
consent. That consent usually is purchased with a subordination agreement, under which the later
lender agrees to take second priority. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 209 (1989).
1994] 1219
Washington University Open Scholarship
1220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
and then receives the returns from the two projects less the total debt
payments. Rearranging terms and using the expression above for the value
of the equity after it takes the first project yields
E. = Ey + (I - -x)(z + s - d2) (2)
Next, substituting for d2 and rearranging terms yields
E.= E,+z+ q + (b-z) (3)
where q = (1 - it)s - i. Notice that the net present value of the later project
is z + (1 - 7t)s - i; the project always returns z, it returns s with probability
(1 - 7), and it costs i to do. Thus, the sum z + q is the net present value
of the later project.
Equation (3) illustrates this important point: were the firm to do the later
project, its value would become the sum of (a) its equity had it done only
the initial project (Ey); (b) the new project's net present value (z + q); and
(c) the third term rr(b - z). This term can be negative; and if it is negative
by a sufficient amount, the equity if the project is taken would be worth
less than the original equity although the project has positive value. In this
case, the firm will reject the project, because doing it would reduce the
equity stake.
The intuition underlying this result was stated above: the firm may have
to promise the new creditor so much to raise the investment cost i that
doing the project is not worthwhile. Look again at equation (2): if the
value of the new debt, d2, exceeds the returns the firm will earn in the
success state, z + s, then the sum in parenthesis is negative, thereby causing
the new equity to be worth less than the old. To see how this can happen,
review equation (1) specifying how much the later creditor will lend. This
equation implies that the firm must promise to repay more than the
investment cost (d2 > i when 7c > 0) in order to raise that cost. Rearranging
this expression shows that
d2 = (4)
1 -itt
Notice that the required return the firm must promise to the later creditor
in the success state, d2, is maximized when the payoff to the later creditor
in the failure state, b, equals zero, and d2 falls as b rises. 8 Also, b will
18. This appears to be true by inspection and is confirmed by differentiating d. with respect to b.
The result is M _ - 7r This expression is negative because t < 1; d is decreasing in b.
Ob (1 - i)
[VOL. 72:1213
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be zero when z + y - d, is zero or negative. Thus, the larger the earlier
debt, d,, is relative to returns in the failure state, z + Y, the larger d2 will
have to be. Hence, a firm whose earlier debt is substantial relative to
failure state returns may have to promise so much to the later creditor that
taking a second positive value project is not worthwhile. This phenomenon
sometimes is referred to as "debt overhang"--the existence of too much
prior debt can prevent firms from undertaking even good projects. 9
Returning to the subject at issue, if the absolute priority rule is not
strictly followed in bankruptcy, the debt overhang effect is worsened, and
the firm will have to reject more good projects. This result occurs because
deviations from absolute priority worsen the later creditor's failure-state
payoff, b; consequently, the creditor's success-state payoff must increase
from d2 to some value d2' greater than d2. To understand this result,
suppose that were absolute priority strictly followed, b would be positive:
that is, b = yt + z - d, > 0. Violating absolute priority has two effects: it
raises d, and reduces the fraction ofyt + z that remains after d, is paid; both
effects reduce b.
For the first effect, the value of the initial debt d,, would be v(d,) = 7Cy,
+ (I - ir)d, were absolute priority strictly followed; the initial creditor takes
y1 in the failure state and is fully repaid in the success state. If the initial
creditor anticipates a deviation, however, it will expect to get less than y,
in the failure state. This reduces the value of its debt. In a competitive
credit market, lenders earn zero profits; hence, v(d,) is a break-even return.
When this return falls, the creditor can avoid losses only by requiring the
firm to promise to return more than d, in the success state. Concerning the
latter effect, under absolute priority the later creditor gets the fraction of
y, + z that remains after d, is paid. When absolute priority is violated, the
creditor must share its failure-state payoff with the equity and so recovers
.(I'1 + z - dl) = ccb, where u, < 1. These two effects lower the later
creditor's failure-state payoff below b and cause that creditor to demand a
19. An underinvestment problem also would exist if the firm finances the second project with
equity. The equity would take behind the initial debt. As a consequence, the firm may have to promise
cquity investors such favorable terms that a positive value project will not be worth doing. The
underinvestment problem can be mitigated if the later creditor is given seniority in the assets
constituting the new project. See Rent M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J.
FIN. ECON. 501 (1985). To do this is, in effect, to decompose the borrower into two firms, one that
does the first project and one that does the second. When there is one project per firm, the agency cost
problem described above vanishes. Giving later creditors seniority in new assets is sometimes done in
real estate finance (e.g., shopping centers in two cities), but such sharp project separations are otherwise
hard to do. For example, a new project can be the modernization of an old project.
1994] 1221
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sum that exceeds d2.
The consequence of relaxing absolute priority is illustrated by calculating
the interest'rate for the later loan. When absolute priority is strictly
followed, the effective interest rate that the later creditor charges for
supplying i is r = d2 - ' 1. Relaxing the rule yields an interest rate ofi
f =d -1. Because d2' > d2, r' > r. When the interest rate increases,
it is more difficult for the firm credibly to promise to repay in the failure
state; hence, the probability that the firm will have to forgo a positive value
project also increases. Deviations from absolute priority thus worsen the
underinvestment problem that solvent firms face.20
The debt overhang problem is maximized when the firm is insolvent
because it may be unable to finance projects at all if later lenders are
subordinate to earlier ones (or even take pro rata). The Bankruptcy Code
authorizes the bankruptcy court to give later lenders a superpriority in any
(or all) of the firm's assets,2 ' which mitigates the debt overhang effect for
insolvent firms. 22 The possibility that bankruptcy courts will so act,
however, exacerbates this effect for solvent firms. This is because the
possibility that "bankruptcy creditors" will get superpriorities lowers the
expected failure-state payoffs of nonbankruptcy creditors; these creditors
know that assets subject to their claims (i.e., y, + z in the model here) can
be devoted to latecomers. This will induce the nonbankruptcy creditors to
demand higher success-state payoffs, and that demand would decrease the
number of positive value projects that are profitable for firms.
23
20. It is inefficient to forgo a positive net present value project. Hence, all good projects would
get done despite the difficulties described above were the parties-actual and potential creditors,
equityholders and managers-able to divide a project's expected surplus among themselves in such
fashion that each would consent to go forward. It is generally assumed that transaction costs preclude
such Coasian bargaining.
21. II U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
22. See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 46
VAND. L. REv. 901, 918-20 (1993).
23. To illustrate this result, recall the second creditor's failure-state payoff above: b =y + z - dl.
Suppose that the bankruptcy court gives a bankruptcy creditor a superpriority if it lends the sum dj.
The second creditor would then be subordinate to both the initial creditor and the bankruptcy creditor.
As a consequence, its failure-state payoff falls to b = y, + z - d, - d3. Thus, the second creditor will
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B. Moral Hazard
The model just discussed assumed that those in control of the firn
sought to maximize firm value. When investors cannot conveniently
monitor the firm's decisionmakers, however, these persons have an
incentive to consume personal benefits rather than to single-mindedly
maximize profits. For example, decisionmakers may reject projects with
high expected values in favor of projects that promise to return less but are
easier to manage. When moral hazard such as this is a concern, an
underinvestment problem can arise even when the firm has no prior debt.
This possibility is demonstrated below both in an intuitive and a formal
version, respectively.24 Its relevance to the absolute priority rule is also
explored.
1. Moral Hazard: A Story
A firm without cash has a project it wishes to undertake that requires
outside funds. The project has a stochastic element: that is, the project
could fail whether the firm used investors' funds exclusively to maximize
project returns or whether the firm instead diverted some cash to the
consumption of perks. The project has a higher probability of success if
the firm's managers attempt to maximize value. Outside investors can
observe whether a project ultimately succeeds or not, but they cannot
observe whether managers took the maximizing action; it is too costly for
them to monitor the managers' behavior.2 The firm could promise to use
investors' funds only to maximize value, but such a promise would not be
credible; investors know that managers who can operate in secret have a
strong incentive to cheat.
In these circumstances, an optimal investment contract has a carrot-and-
stick property. The carrot is a bribe to the firm to take the profit-
maximizing action (i.e., to eschew perks); the stick is to give project assets
to the investors if the firm fails to repay them (this contract thus is a loan).
If the bribe is high enough, the firm does better when it consumes the
24. The analysis in the next sections is drawn from Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Financial
Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector (Mimeograph 1994) (on file with the Washington
University Law Quarterly). A similar model is in Takeo Hoshi et al., The Choice Between Public and
Private Debt: An Examination of Post-Regulation Corporate Financing in Japan (MIT Working Paper,
1992).
25. The moral hazard in this story arises between the firm and new investors, who cannot monitor
the manager's behavior.
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bribe, maximizes expected project returns, and repays investors than when
it slacks off to consume perks. The investors also know that they will be
repaid when they observe success because the stick permits them to take
over project assets.
Accordingly, project returns under this contract must support both the
bribe that will induce the firm to maximize project value and a return on
the investors' money. Some projects that have positive expected value,
however, cannot ensure the investors a sufficient return given that the
projects also must support the bribe-call such projects "weak." The
investors' return under any project is the sum of the expected value of
payments to them in the success and failure states. Weak projects, ex
hypothesis, generate insufficient revenue in success states to support bribes
to the firm and payments to investors. Hence, a weak project can be
funded only if the firm can increase the investors' payoff in the failure
state. Thus, a firm that has a weak project must allow investors to take
nonproject assets as well as project assets if the project fails; i.e., the
"stick" in an optimal investment contract sometimes permits investors to
take not only project assets but other of the firm's assets as well.
A relevant implication of this analysis is that an underinvestment
problem can exist. Firms with weak positive value projects but few other
assets sometimes will be unable to get financing. This analysis explains the
common perception that borrowers without liquid assets often have trouble
getting money.
On this view, deviations from absolute priority are undesirable. To see
why, realize that when absolute priority is violated, creditors receive only
a share of the firm's assets. Then assume that investors (i.e., creditors) will
not finance a project that has positive net present value unless the firm also
possesses nonproject assets of at least v* that the investors can reach in the
failure state, and that the firm has assets of only v*. If absolute priority is
followed, the firm will be able to do the project because it can promise all
of v* to investors in the failure state. But if absolute priority is violated,
the firm cannot credibly promise to repay as much as v*; for the firm's
owners, ex post, will take some of these assets for themselves. Thus, if
investors anticipate that absolute priority will not be followed, the firm will
be unable to do the project even though the project has positive value; the
firm cannot credibly promise the investors enough in the failure state to
induce them to provide the money.
This result may be expressed a little more broadly. The bankruptcy
scheme that is in place can be viewed as an implied term in the parties'
investment contract. Therefore, the optimal bankruptcy scheme cannot be
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determined independently of the determination of the optimal investment
contract. A moral hazard explanation of a standard investment contract was
just set out: the firm is unable to commit not to misuse investment funds,
and so must be able, in some other way, to make a credible repayment
promise. To do that may require the firm to possess liquid assets other
than those that constitute the project at issue. A bankruptcy scheme that
encourages deviations from absolute priority reduces the assets that a firm
can devote to investors in the failure state, and thus lessens the firm's
ability to make a credible repayment promise. Thus, such a scheme would
not, ceteris paribus, be part of an optimal debt contract.
The effect of deviations from absolute priority on firms that already are
in bankruptcy is ambiguous. Moral hazard may be less of a danger because
the firm is under (indirect) judicial supervision and heightened creditor
scrutiny. Thus the owners' ability to misappropriate returns is circum-
scribed. On the other hand, to the extent moral hazard remains a danger,
the firm may require nonproject assets to pursue needed positive value
projects: deviations from absolute priority lessen the insolvent firm's ability
to devote those assets to project finance. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy
Code can mitigate this difficulty because it authorizes the court to give the
later creditor a broad, senior security interest. Doing this, however,
worsens the ex ante underinvestment problem: when creditors anticipate
superpriorities, they know that the firm's promise to offer up nonproject
assets in the failure state is not credible. Thus, fewer positive value
projects will be funded initially.
2. Moral Hazard: A Model26
Assume that at to, the firm has an investment project that returns r at t'
if it succeeds and nothing if it fails. The firm has v of fixed assets that will
be used in production but has no cash; thus, it must raise c from investors
to do the project. Both the firm and the investors are risk neutral. The
firm can take either of two actions after it raises c. A good action
dedicates all of c to the project and generates a success probability of pg.
A bad action diverts a portion of c, denoted b, to the owners' personal
satisfaction. When assets are diverted, the success probability is Pb, where
Pb < pg. Investors can observe whether the project succeeds or not but
cannot observe which action the firm took. Assume that
26. This section formally restates the results set out above. Readers uninterested in technical
analysis should move to the Conclusion.
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pgr - c > 0 > pbr - (c - b) (1)
The expected value of the bad action is negative (the second inequality)
while the expected value of the good action will fully cover project cost
(the first inequality). An investment contract will promise to repay
investors z, where i = g (for success) or b (for failure). Such a contract is
feasible only if zg < r + v and zb < v: the firm cannot promise to repay
more than it has-assets plus return in the good state, and assets alone in
the bad state. The firm is the residual claimant. Its return from doing the
investment is ag = r + v - zg (for success) and ab = v - Zb (for failure).
There are two questions: whether to invest in the project, and whether a
feasible investment contract exists. Since the project earns negative returns
when the firm takes the bad action and consumes the perk, a necessary
condition for investors to supply the funds is that the investment contract
must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint:
Pgag + (1 - Pg)ab > pbag + (1 - pb)ab + b (2)
This constraint requires the firm to earn a higher expected return from
taking the good action-generating the high success probability-than from
taking the bad action-generating the low success probability-but
consuming the perk. Equation (2) simplifies to:
b
ag -ab ;_- (3)
AP
where Ap = pg - Pb. Hence, for the firm to invest efficiently, it must be
given a reward that is at least as great as the opportunity cost of maximiz-
ing the success probability (which is ag - ab).
It is optimal to undertake the project if a contract exists that satisfies the
incentive compatibility constraint-i.e., equation (3)-and under which the
investor at least breaks even. This can be represented as:
PgZg + (1 -Pg) b > C (4)
To see why, realize that (4), the investors' participation constraint, can be
written as an equality by subtracting a constant from zg and zb (i.e. reducing
the investors' payoff and increasing the firm's payoff). When (4) is an
equality, the firm gets all the surplus. By equation (1) the firm will then
take the good action because the total return from doing that exceeds the
total return from taking the bad action and consuming the perk.
Thus, the question is whether there is a viable investment contract that
satisfies equations (3) and (4). The set of such contracts will make ab, the
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firm's failure-state payoff, zero. Any contract that gives the firm more in
the failure state can be replaced by a contract that gives it less then and
more in the success state (i.e., raises ag) without changing the investor's
payoff or, consequently, the firm's payoff. Reducing ab to zero is desirable
because this reduction makes the incentive compatibility constraint easier
to satisfy. Equation (3) becomes
b (5)
Ap
This is easier to satisfy than (3) because the left side is larger while the
right side remains the same. The easier the constraint is to satisfy, the
wider is the range of project returns that can support bribes to take the
good action. Put simply, when the incentive compatibility constraint is
easiest to satisfy, the number of weak positive value projects that are
financed is maximized.
We are interested in the relation between the firm's investment policy
and the amount of liquid assets, v, that the firm has. To analyze this, recall
that the minimum payment necessary to keep the firm diligent is ag = b/Ap
and ab = 0. Substituting these values into equation (4), the investors'
participation constraint, and solving for v yields
v , v*= c - p(r - -L) (6)Ap
The right side of equation (6) can be zero or negative: in these cases, the
expected value of the investor's return (the second term), even after
subtracting the expected value of the bribe, equals or exceeds the
investment cost, c. Then v* _< 0; that is, no nonproject assets are required
to finance the project because it generates sufficiently high expected
returns. When the right side of equation (6) is positive, however, so also
is v*: the project alone cannot both support the bribe and ensure the
investor a competitive return. In this event, the firm will be capital
constrained unless it has enough nonproject assets to offer the investor.
To make clear that positive value projects can be rejected, rewrite
equation (6):
pr - c = pg( ) - v* (7)
Recall that the left side of this equality (the project's net present value) is
assumed to exceed zero. Because this is an equality, the right side must
exceed zero as well. Consequently, the firm earns a positive rent: the
expected value of the bribe (p,( b-)) exceeds the nonproject assets that theAp
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firm would have to yield in the failure state, v*. This rent must be paid
from the left side of (7), the project's surplus. Thus, project returns must
support both the investor's payoff and the bribe. When v < v*, the rent
must increase, but then there would not be sufficient funds to pay it: a
positive value project cannot support both the investor's payoff and the
rent, so the project will not be financed.
Now consider the effect of, deviations from absolute priority. A
deviation ensures the firm a payoff in the failure state: ab > 0. Recall that
the incentive compatibility constraint requires the optimal investment
contract to satisfy the condition ab = 0 (equation (5)). This makes the
constraint easiest to satisfy while insuring the investor a competitive return.
The easier the constraint, the more positive value projects are funded.
When the law requires the firm's failure-state payoff to exceed zero, the
left side of equation (5) falls to ag - ab < ag while the right side remains the
same. Consequently, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes harder
to satisfy. This is inefficient. The greater is the expected deviation from
absolute priority (i.e., the larger ab is), the greater is the inefficiency.
Hence, an anticipated deviation from absolute priority can create a capital-
constrained firm when otherwise such a firm would not exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis here unfortunately does not support particular policy
prescriptions. The conventional wisdom holds that the absolute priority
rule exacerbates the overinvestment problem that solvent firms sometimes
face. It is difficult to say how serious this problem is, however, because
investors can mitigate it by using convertible debt or demanding debt with
call provisions. These contract clauses are unhelpful in bankruptcy, but
then deviations from absolute priority reduce the firm's incentive to
overinvest. This suggests that deviations are desirable on net. Also,
deviations can mitigate an underinvestment problem that is peculiar to
insolvent firms: that a firm has no reason to pursue a positive value project
when project returns would accrue only to creditors. On the other hand,
this Comment has shown that an underinvestment problem exists for
solvent firms that is worsened by deviations from absolute priority. The
causes of this problem, the existence of prior debt and moral hazard, exist
for insolvent firms as well. Bankruptcy courts have the authority to, and
do, mitigate this problem for these firms, but if investors anticipate how
bankruptcy actually works, the ex ante underinvestment problem is
exacerbated. That investors are not myopic is a plausible view.
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Thus, the question whether deviations from absolute priority are desirable
or not is difficult to answer.27 There is a need for more theory and more
data. Analysts may be tempted to have recourse to norms of distributional
justice or desert in the absence of these, but those norms offer little
assistance and seem irrelevant. Deviations from absolute priority benefit
equity at the expense of junior debt ex post." The question of which of
these investor groups is more deserving or more needy in general
apparently poses an intractable problem in moral theory. Resolution of the
problem seems unnecessary, however, because sophisticated investors
anticipate deviations and so price them out. Therefore, moral theory is
both unhelpful and seldom germane (due to investor behavior). The search
for efficient solutions should continue.
27. In an earlier paper, see Schwartz, supra note 1, I argued that anticipated deviations from
absolute priority could act as a bribe to induce insolvent firms to settle disputes privately rather than
make excessive use of formal bankruptcy procedures. The analysis which generated that conclusion
assumed that firms could contract out of bankruptcy but that otherwise the current Code remained in
place. whether relaxing absolute priority would be the best way to encourage efficient settlement in
a world with a satisfactory bankruptcy system is hard to say.
28. See, e.g., Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations From the Absolute Priority
Rule in Bankriptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FiN. 1457, 1468 (1990) (reporting that of a sample of 30
bankruptcy cases filed after 1978, 24 resulted in creditor deficits, and in 23 of these 24 cases sharehold-
ers received payments in violation of the absolute priority rule).
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